University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1998

The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations
Jack L. Goldsmith
Curtis A. Bradley

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis A. Bradley, "The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations," 92
American Journal of International Law 675 (1998).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

1998]

AGORA: BREARD

is my responsibility and the responsibility of law enforcement and judicial officials
throughout the Commonwealth. I cannot cede such responsibility to the International Court of Justice.
Mr. Breard having committed a heinous and depraved murder, his guilt being
unquestioned, and the legal issues being resolved against him, and the U.S. Supreme
I find no reason to
Court having denied the petitions of Breard and Paraguay,
37
interfere with his sentence. Accordingly, I decline to do so.
The International Court ofJustice remains seised of the case initiated by Paraguay.
JONATHAN I. CHARNEY AND W. MICHAEL REISMAN

THE ABIDING RELEVANCE OF FEDERALISM TO

U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

The international law community has heavily criticized the United States' handling of
the Breard case. These criticisms are understandable. Perhaps because of the rush of
time, the explanations by the Department ofJustice and the Supreme Court for failing
to stop Breard's execution brushed over important issues of domestic and international
law. In addition, Virginia's decision to proceed with the execution, and the federal
Government's decision not to block it, may have reflected insufficient respect for international law and institutions. These decisions may also adversely affect U.S. relations with
other nations and weaken consular protection of U.S. citizens abroad. These criticisms,
however, tell only part of the story. In particular, they do not consider countervailing
considerations grounded in the Constitution's allocation of authority between the federal
and state governments.
Conventional wisdom tells us that this country's federal structure is irrelevant to the
national Government's exercise of its foreign relations powers. This conventional wisdom
is reflected in old Supreme Court dicta.' It also pervades foreign relations scholarship.
It underlies, for example, the claims that federal courts should apply customary interna2
tional law as self-executing federal common law that trumps state law; that the treaty
makers can make supreme federal law even if otherwise beyond the authority of the
federal Government;3 and that courts, on their own initiative, should invalidate state
4
laws affecting foreign relations under a "dormant" preemption rationale.
7
Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore
Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998).
' See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937) ("[uIn respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State
. . does not exist."); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several
States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but
one people, one nation, one power."); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316
(1936) ("[S]ince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been
carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other
source.").
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of internationalLaw, 1994 Sup.
CT. REV. 295, 304, 332 n.109; Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1555, 1559 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 184647 (1998).
'See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE UNIrrED STATES CONSITrTION 191, 197 (2d ed. 1996)
("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the
states 'do not exist.' "); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and
"Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CmI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530 (1991); Gerald L. Neuman, The GlobalDimension of
RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 46-48 (1997).
' See, e.g., Daniel Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of InternationalLaw: Toward a Federal Common Law of
InternationalChoice ofLaw, 74 IoWA L. REv. 165, 167, 182-83 (1988);John Norton Moore, FederalismandForeign
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In accordance with this conventional wisdom, commentators have tended to view the
foreign relations concerns in the Breard case as an absolute value, and to ignore any
competing federalism concerns. This attitude is evident in many of the articles in this
Agora. It also was evident in the amicus curiae brief filed in the Supreme Court by
"professors of law expert in the fields of international law and the application of international law by the courts of the United States." 5 This brief emphasized "the potential
consequences for the United States of non-compliance with an ICJ provisional measures
ruling" and urged the Court to issue a stay "to ensure that actions of the authorities
in Virginia.. . do not inadvertently cause incalculable and irreparable harm on the
international plane." 6 Nowhere in the brief, however, is there any discussion of Virginia's
interests in enforcing its criminal laws and retaining control over its criminal justice
system, even as factors to be balanced against the potential foreign relations harm.
The federal Government, by contrast, assigned significant weight to Virginia's interests.
Although the federal Government took concrete steps to address the foreign relations
implications in the Breard case,7 it ultimately viewed considerations grounded in federalism as taking precedence. The Solicitor General noted that "the State of Virginia would
be harmed by an order preventing it from carrying out its lawfully entered judgment of
execution in a timely fashion." 8 The Solicitor General also argued that, even were the
ICJ Order binding on the international plane, on the domestic plane "our federal system
imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice
system of the States." 9 In conformity with this view, the Department of State, which
signed the Solicitor General's brief, acknowledged "Virginia's right to go forward" with
Breard's execution, and "with great reluctance" requested that it not do so.'0 The lower
federal courts expressed concern about foreign relations consequences but, nonetheless,
declined to adjudicate Breard's and Paraguay's claims because of the federal habeas
corpus procedural default doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment, both of which are
premised on respect for state sovereignty." Finally, the Supreme Court, in declining to
stay Breard's execution, stated that, while it was "unfortunate that [the motion for a
stay] comes before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ," it was the Governor
of Virginia's prerogative whether to stay the execution and
"nothing in [the Court's]
2
existing -case law allows us to make that choice for him."'
These uniform governmental views belie the conventional wisdom concerning the
irrelevance of federalism to foreign relations. And it is these views, rather than the
conventional wisdom, that are consistent with our constitutional design and history. The
Relations, 1965 DUKE LJ. 248, 275-76; Donald T. Trautman, Toward FederalizingChoice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1715, 1735-36 (1992).
5 See Statement Amicus Curiae of International Law Professors George A. Bermann, David D. Caron, Abram
Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, Richard N. Gardner, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Andreas Lowenfeld,
W. Michael Reisman, Oscar Schachter, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Edith Brown Weiss at 1, Republic of Paraguay
v. Gilmore, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (No. 97-1390).
6 Id. at 8-9.
7The federal Government acknowledged that the Vienna Convention had been violated, apologized to
Paraguay, and took several new steps to ensure that federal, state, and local officials would be aware of, and
comply with, the consular notification and consultation provisions of the Vienna Convention. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, 12, Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (Nos. 97-8214, 97-1390).
s Id. at 48.
9
Id. at 51.
10Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine KL Albright to Governor of Virginia James Gilmore (Apr.
13, 1998).
" See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 627-29 (4th Cir. 1998); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615,
619-20 (4th Cir. 1998); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996); Breard
v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996).
12Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998).
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goal of the United States Constitution was to establish a more perfect domestic order.1 3
One means to this end was the creation of a federal structure that allocated authority
between a central government and subnational governments."4 Another means was the
establishment of a governmental system that could successfully conduct foreign relations.
It had become clear during the Articles of Confederation period that effective foreign
relations required more centralized control.15 But the Constitution did not make foreign
relations an absolute value, and it did not exclude all state authority that might have an
effect on foreign relations. Instead, the Framers addressed the tension between federalism and foreign relations in two ways. First, the Constitution prohibits the states from
exercising certain traditional foreign relations powers such as treaty making and war
declaration.16 Second, it gives the federal political branches broad executory foreign
relations powers and creates a supremacy clause, federal executive, and federal judiciary
to ensure state compliance with exercises of this authority.' 7 This institutional arrangement treats foreign relations and federalism as competing values and largely leaves it to
the federal political branches to decide when a state act has sufficiently adverse effects
on foreign relations to require preemption.'
Our constitutional history is replete with examples of states engaging in activities that
harm our foreign relations. Sometimes the federal political branches decide that the
foreign relations interest outweighs decentralized state control over the activity in question, and through treaty, statute, or executive action, seek to invalidate the offending
state activity. But on many other occasions, the federal political branches decide that
the national
interest in foreign relations does not trump the competing federalism
19
concern.

Consider three recent examples. First, the United States has entered into several
human rights treaties in the last decade. The Senate has consistently attached both a
"federalism understanding" and a "non-self-executing" declaration as a condition of
its consent to these treaties. 20 These provisions are designed to ensure that the treaty
obligations have no domestic force and do not alter the balance of authority between
the state and federal governments. 2' Second, although California's multinational corporate tax provoked a diplomatic outcry for decades, opponents of the tax were unable to
persuade the federal political branches to preempt it.2 2 In upholding the constitutionality
See U.S. CONST., Preamble; THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
"See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison).
-'See FREDERICK
W. MARKS M, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND
TION (2d ed. 1986); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4 (JohnJay).
",U.S. CONSr. Art I, §10.

THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrU-

17See, also in this Agora, Carlos Manuel Vlizquez, Breard and the FederalPower to Require Compliance with ICJ
Orders of ProvisionalMeasures, infta pp. 683, 684-85. It is worth noting that the famous Supreme Court dicta
regarding the irrelevance of federalism to foreign relations, see supra note 1, all came in cases in which the
political branches had affirmatively acted to create federal law.
" This is not to say that in the foreign affairs area the federal political branches have unlimited authority
to preempt the states. The Constitution creates a federal Government of limited and enumerated powers, and
it reserves to the states and the people the powers not delegated to the federal Government. See, e.g., City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); U.S. CONST.
amend. X. There may be some instances, therefore, in which the federal political branches will lack the
authority to override state law, even pursuant to a treaty. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming).
' See generally DENNiSJ. PALUMBO, THE STATES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1960) ;Jack L.Goldsmith,
FederalCourts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1650-58 (1997).
I"See, e.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. $4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992), reprinted in 89 AJIL 109, 111 (1995).
21 See PeterJ. Spiro, The States and InternationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567, 574-75 (1997).
'' SeeBRi',N HOCKING, LOCAUZINGFOREIGNPOLCY:. NoN-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTSAND MULTILAYERED DEMOCRAcy 130-51 (1993).
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of the tax against the charge that it adversely affected foreign relations and frustrated
the United States' ability to "speak with one voice" in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it was the job of "Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation'sto evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy. ' 23 Third, notwithstanding the foreign relations interests at stake, the political
branches were sensitive to the federalism concerns associated with the GATT and NAFTA
trade agreements. As a result, the implementing statutes for these agreements provide
for a federal-state consultation process and allow only the federal Government to challenge state laws as being in violation of the agreements. 24 In these and many other
foreign relations situations, the federal Government takes into account respect for state
sovereignty in computing the national interest.
This brings us back to the Breard case. There was substantial uncertainty in the case
regarding whether the United States was obligated under international law to stay the
execution, 25 and, if so, what effect such an obligation had in the U.S. legal system.
In the face of this uncertainty, there was room for disagreement over which valueaccommodation of the various foreign relations interests in the case or respect for
Virginia's sovereignty-was more important to the national interest. The Constitution
leaves the resolution of such an issue largely to the elected officials in the federal
Government.26 The President and the Senate had entered into several treaties relevant
to the Breard litigation. Taken alone, these treaties might have preempted state law. 27 It
is well settled, however, that for domestic purposes, a later-enacted federal statute prevails
over a prior inconsistent treaty.28 And in large part out of federalism and related concerns, Congress decided in the subsequent Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (with exceptions not relevant to Breard) that a federal court should not hold an
evidentiary hearing for habeas claims based on a treaty violation where the petitioner
' Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994). This decision may have eliminated
the remnants of the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine announced in Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968). See 512 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J.,. concurring); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customaty
InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Oitique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 865 (1997);
Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 1699-1701. Professor Kirgis suggests in this Agora that Zschernigi,.still good law,
and that it "appl[ies] to the Breardsituation" to the extent that it is properly read as "prohibit[ing] states
from 'intruding' on the exclusive national authority in foreign affairs." Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller
and the Breard Matter, infra p. 704, 707. Even if Zsczernig retained such vitality, however, it is hard to see how
it would be relevant to the Breardlitigation, where extant federal statutes and the federal Executive supported
Virginia's
nondiscriminatory application of its rules limiting postconviction relief.
2
See 19 U.S.C. §3512 (1994) (GATT); 19 U.S.C. §3312 (NAFTA).
2 The United Nations Charter obligates the United States to "comply with the decision of the International
Court ofJustice in any case to which it is a party." UN CHARTER Art. 94(1). It is not clear, however, whether
the Provisional Measures Order in the Breardcase qualifies as a "decision" under this provision. Nor is it clear
whether the ICJ intended the Provisional Measures Order to be binding and, if so, what power the ICJ has
to issue such an order. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at 49-Mi,.
21 The Constitution may control the resolution of some of these questions through, for example, its limitations on federal courtjurisdiction in the 11th Amendment. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998).
' It is far from clear, however, that Virginia's exhaustion and procedural default doctrines conflict with the
Vienna Convention in a way that would require preemption. The Convention states that the rights it confers
"shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36(2), 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261. As the Supreme Court noted,
"By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise his rights under the
Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Wrginia." Breard,
118 S.Ct. at 1355 (emphasis added). To be sure, the Convention also states that "said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended." Id. It is unclear what "full effect" means here. But it is not self-evident that a limitation on
postconviction relief denies full effect to the rights in the Convention, any more than applying such a limitation
to U.S. constitutional rights precludes them from having full effect.
' See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600-02 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
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has failed to develop the factual basis for the claim in state court. 29 In addition, the
executive branch elected not to pursue other possible remedies against Virginia in the
Breard case, in large part because of federalism concerns. The political branches thus
viewed foreign relations not as an absolute value but, rather, as one to be weighed against
other values, including federalism.
In deciding how to reconcile the competing values of federalism and foreign relations,
the political branches must resolve complex trade-offs between domestic and international interests and, in addition, among competing foreign relations priorities?0° Sometimes disagreement among the political branches over the relative priority of domestic
and international interests can lead to difficult questions about the distribution of foreign
relations authority at the federal level. There was no such difficulty in the Breard litigation,
however, because the branches of the federal Government were unanimous in believing
that it was Virginia's prerogative whether or not to stay the execution. This view can of
course be criticized. The key point, however, is that the Constitution contemplates that this
is a decision for the political branches to strike. Foreign relations interests must be weighed
against competing federalism concerns.
The Breard case thus teaches many lessons. It shows that foreign relations concerns
are but one component of the national interest to be weighed against, and sometimes
overridden by, other concerns. It stands as an important reminder that the United States
has a dualist Constitution that controls its domestic implementation of international
obligations." And it is a signal that, far from being a relic of the past, federalism continues
to play a vibrant role in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.
CURTIS A. BRADLEYAND JACK L. GOLDSMITH*

PROVISIONAL MEASURES,

U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AND THE STATES

In Paraguayv. United States, the International Court of Justice entered the following
Order: The Court "[i] ndicates the following provisional measures: The United States
should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
'See 28 U.S.C-A §2254(a), (e) (West Supp. 1998); see also Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1355.
" In the Breard litigation, a decision by the Executive to compel Virginia's compliance with the ICJ Order
might well have had an adverse impact on other foreign relations interests by, for example, causing a backlash
in the Senate with respect to U.S. payment of dues in the United Nations or participation in the proposed
international criminal court. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, On a Foreign Death Row, WASH. POsr, Apr. 14, 1998,
at A15.
1There are manyjudicial decisions, in addition to those in the Breardcase, that confirm this country's dualist
approach to international obligations. See, e.g., Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality) (concluding that
treaties and executive agreements are subject to "[tihe prohibitions of the Constitution"); Whitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that a federal statute supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty); GarciaMir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the President and Congress have the
domestic authority to override customary international law); see alsoUnited States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 668, 670 (1992) (holding that the abduction of a criminal defendant from Mexico, although it "may be
in %iolationof general international law principles," "does not. . . prohibit his trial in a court in the United
States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1
(1989) (rejecting the argument that the Court should consult international practice in construing the Eighth
Amendment because "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"). For additional discussion
of the dualist nature of the U.S. relationship with international law, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Breard Case,
Our Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51 STAN. L. Ry. (forthcoming 1999).
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law, and Associate Professor, University of Chicago
Law School, respectively.

